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Academic Self-Government in the 
United States 
H O W A R D  O. HUNTER 
A UNIVERSITY is like any other complex institution in that it requires 
numerous general and particular decisions about the use of its resources 
and the manner of its operations. Public laws and constitutions as well 
as the charters, ordinances, statutes and by-laws of the university provide 
the maps for the distribution of the rights to make decisions which are 
binding upon members of the university, or, more exactly, those who fill 
the roles that, taken all together, comprise the university. 
Universities cannot be wholly self-contained. They are rarely, if ever, 
financially self-supporting, least of all at present; furthermore, they 
depend for their legal existence on charters granted by governments in 
accordance with externally established laws and regulations. The United 
States is one of the few Western countries which has a substantial 
number of private universities of outstanding quality in teaching and 
research. Even those with large endowments and those with as little 
connection as possible with governments, such as institutions associated 
with fundamentalist churches, are not economically independent of 
governments. Some of them receive, directly or indirectly, government 
funds in support of research or student tuition fees, and most of them 
enjoy special privileges under the tax laws. 1 Thus at least some of the 
activities of universities are limited by the decisions of laymen, i.e., by 
persons who are not academic members of the university. No matter 
how extensive academic self-government may be, it is effective only 
within the limits set by external or lay authorities who provide the 
university with funds and often stipulate, in various ways and to various 
degrees, the uses of those funds. This is true even of institutions which 
rely almost exclusively on revenue from tuition fees and gifts and 
endowments. They must abide by laws and regulations of general 
application, many of which limit the freedom of decision by their 
academic members, and to some extent they must take into account the 
market for the services of their graduates and the desires of some of 
their major patrons. 
There are many patterns for the distribution of authority to make the 
decisions which regulate university activities. These patterns may be 
described as forms of the stratification of authority. The strata are 
1 Under current law, a loan to a student guaranteed by the federal government requires 
the application of federal laws and regulations as much as if there were a direct grant to 
the institution. See, Grove City College v. B e l l , - -  U.S. - - ,  104 S. Ct. 1211 (1984); 
Bob Jones University v. Johnson, 396 F. Supp. 597 (D.S.C. 1974), affd. mem., 529 F.2d 
514 (4th Cir. 1975). 
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numerous. At the level of ultimate authority over the university they 
may include officials in ministries of higher education, and lay boards of 
regents or governors--for governmentally founded and supported 
institutions---or trustees---for private institutions2---with an admixture of 
academic members, who are either appointed as deans, presidents, etc., 
or who are elected by the academic body of the university, according to 
various criteria. (The lay members of governing bodies are laymen only 
in the sense that they are not academic members of the university over 
which they have governing powers.) 
The academic body is itself another stratum, and has several sub- 
strata within itself made up of ranks ranging from full professorships to 
junior posts such as instructorships or assistantships. There is an 
intermediate layer between the ultimate authority and the academic 
staff. This is the stratum of university administrators, presidents, vice- 
chancellors, rectors, principals, provosts, and numerous incumbents of 
derivative roles, such as vice-presidents, deans, departmental chairmen 
and registrars. These administrative officers are sometimes active 
academics performing the regular academic duties of teaching and 
research as well as administration; sometimes they are academics who 
have temporarily left their academic work; sometimes they are former 
academics who have ceased to do academic work and who have entered 
on careers as university administrators; there are others who have never 
been academics. There is a peripheral circle of postdoctoral fellows, 
research fellows, teaching assistants and research assistants. There is also 
the stratum of students who make up the majority of the population of 
all universities. Finally, there is the stratum of auxiliaries such as 
librarians--who sometimes also perform academic duties and hold 
academic appointments--laboratory technicians and assistants, secret- 
aries, computer experts, telephonists, skilled craftsmen, porters, janitors 
and custodial workers. 
There is an additional locus of external control that operates both 
formally and informally. Professional associations control entry into their 
respective professions and by this control have affected the curricula of 
medical schools, law schools and other professional schools. In the 
United States, external, non-governmental bodies can "accredit" whole 
institutions or more specialised professional schools. If "accreditation" is 
refused, that affects the status of the university, the ability of its 
graduates to obtain employment, 3 and its ability to attract candidates of 
2 For purposes of simplicity, the governing body of a private university is called a board 
of trustees and that of a state-supported university a board of regents. There are many 
variations in designation. The governing body of Yale University, for instance, is the Yale 
Corporation and the individuals who serve on the board are the "members" of the 
corporation. Some states designate their governing bodies as boards of "governors" or 
"overseers". 
3 A graduate of an unaccredited law school, for instance, is unable to sit for the bar 
examination in most states of the United States. 
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appropriate quality for academic appointment. Most recently, trade 
unions of academics have intruded into academic institutions and have 
gained influence over decisions about promotions and permanence of 
tenure. Finally, organs of public opinion, such as the press and private 
voluntary organisations, have imposed certain decisions on universities 
through lawsuits, public agitation and pressure on legislative bodies. 
These various strata are present wherever there are ~universities. They 
may be present in differing proportions, and the l ines  of stratification 
vary from university to university and over time in the same university. 
Within universities, despite the constant presence of these various strata, 
there are markedly different patterns of the distribution of authority for 
making significant decisions about the operations of the institution. 
Academic self-government is one of the patterns of the distribution of 
authority. It is one in which the major decisions regarding the policies 
and practices of universities are made by governing bodies consisting of 
regular teachers, even though there remain many important decisions 
which are made by the other strata in varying degrees and combinations. 
The nineteenth-century German university has provided the modern 
model of academic self-government, but in Germany the creation of 
professorial chairs and the appointment of professors in universities were 
ultimately dependent on approval by ministers or their delegates. The 
development of universities in other European countries followed 
somewhat different patterns, but few went so far as the German model 
in exalting the concept of academic self-government. In every instance, 
there was substantial external influence, either from the church or from 
the government. 4 
In American universities the preponderance of power long rested with 
trustees, presidents and deans, who were often responsible to other 
external authorities, such as the governing hierarchy of a church, but in 
the twentieth century there has been a considerable shift towards 
academic self-government. This has occurred most extensively in the 
leading private universities, but the major state universities have tended 
to follow the pattern. The shift has not been unilinear. In recent years, 
the federal government, which had not had much concern with higher 
education until after the Second World War, has intruded into the 
internal arrangements of universities. 
4 For a brief description of the development of the universities in Great Britain 
see Ashby, Eric and Anderson, Mary, Universities: British, Indian, African 
(London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1966), pp. 3-44; Rashdall, Hastings, The 
Universities of  Europe in the Middle Ages (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1936); and Davie, 
G. E., The Democratic Intellect: Scotland and Her Universities in the Nineteenth Century 
(Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1961). On the German universities of the 
nineteenth century, see Paulsen, Friedrich, The German Universities and University Study 
(London: Longman Green, 1968). 
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The Locus of Authority in American Universities 
One of the issues of discussion, sometimes silent, sometimes audible, 
in American universities has been the proper location of authority within 
the institution. In a formal sense the "owners" are either the trustees in 
private universities or the regents as agents of the state in public 
universities. Formal, legal ownership does not resolve the issue, however, 
because legal title to the physical assets is not the same as actual control 
of policies and the making of decisions about particular cases, and least 
of all about educational, scientific and scholarly questions. Even less 
does an answer which cites legal ownership of physical assets say 
anything about the system of university government which is most 
conducive to the attainment of the proper objectives of universities. 
The immediate response of many academics to the question of 
university government is to say that their chief interest is in academic 
freedom. This is not an irrelevant response, but neither is it a satisfactory 
one. An individual university teacher may have academic freedom 
without participating in the government of his or her university. The 
justification for academic freedom is that it protects the individual 
academic's freedom to pursue and teach the truth of his field of 
competence; how a university is governed is a different matter. Yet the 
two things are related to one another. It might indeed be argued that 
academic self-government is the best protection for academic freedom, 
because the governors, if rational, will pursue their ideal interest, which 
is the teaching and discovery of truth about their subject-matters. For 
academics who are faithful to their calling, their ideal interest is also 
their self-interest. These self-interests, collectively, serve the fundamental 
objectives of the university. 
There is some legal protection in the United States for the institution 
of academic freedom, which, it has been argued, is closely associated with 
the bundle of legal rights protected by the first amendment to the 
Constitution of the United States. Academic freedom has never so 
clearly enjoyed the degree of protection accorded to free speech, but, 
nevertheless, there is a tendency towards its legal protection. 5 An 
individual university teacher has more legal protection in a state 
university than in a private one, because the United States Constitution 
serves primarily as a limitation on state action. The regents or the 
administrators of a state university are employees and agents of a state, 
and their acts in governing the university are the acts of that state. They 
cannot exceed the authority of the state or violate constitutional 
limitations on the exercise of that authority. The trustees of a private 
university are bound by the ordinary rules of contract, and only 
peripherally by the provisions of the United States Constitution or the 
5 See Hunter, Howard O., "The Constitutional Status of Academic Freedom in the 
United States", Minerva, XIX (Winter 1981), pp. 519-568. 
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constitution of a particular state. Courts may invoke the tradition of 
academic freedom when interpreting the nature of the contractual 
relation between an individual academic and a private university, but the 
trustees of such a university do have more freedom of action than the 
regents of a state university. 
A good example of the difference between the several legal standards 
is apparent in the treatment of academic members of the institution on 
appointment for a defined period of time without permanence of tenure. 
A state university may be required to have a "due process" hearing 
before deciding whether to renew the contract of an assistant professor 
on a short-term appointment. If the custom of the institution is to 
reappoint assistant professors for two or three one-year terms, there 
may be an expectation of continued employment which creates a 
"property" interest, and the state may not deprive anyone of property, 
even of such a tenuous nature, without due process of law. 6 The process 
does not have to be formal, but the teacher is entitled to advance notice 
that his reappointment is under consideration and he must be given the 
opportunity to appear and to present his case for continued employment. 
The university usually must present some "cause" for non-renewal. By 
comparison, the trustees and administrators of a private university do 
not have to hold any hearings and can decide on their own whether or 
not reappointment is appropriate unless they have, by their own actions 
or regulations, led the candidate to believe that he will have the 
protection of some kind of formal procedure or have given him good 
reason to believe that he will be reappointed. In any event, the legal 
relation between the teacher at a private institution and his university 
will be examined in the context of the common law of contracts and not 
in the context of constitutional rights. 
Although this illustration shows the difference in the legal rules 
applicable to public as opposed to private institutions, the differences in 
reality tend to be slight. A state university can avoid the creation of an 
expectation of continued employment or reappointment by explicitly 
stating the terms of the appointment in the original contract and by 
explicit university regulations. 7 In practice, many institutions, whether 
public or private, have procedures requiring notice and review. 
Furthermore, all universities are subject to the same "equal employment 
opportunity" laws as other employers, and may not discriminate on the 
basis of sex, race, physical handicap, religion or national origin. 8 
6 Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593 (1972); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 
(1972). 
7 A state university cannot, however, make an appointment conditional on an agreement 
to forego some constitutionall~r protected individual right. See, e.g., Pickering v. Board of 
Education, 391 U.S. 563 (1968). 
8 See, Title 20, United States Code, sections 1618-1686; Title 29, United States Code, section 
794; Title 42, United States Code, sections 2000d-2000d-6; 45 Code of Federal Regulations, 
sections 80.6-80.10, 81.1-81.131, 84.61, 86.71. 
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The law provides some guidance in deciding problems which arise 
about academic freedom and tenure of appointment, but it gives little 
help in deciding the proper pattern of university government. As the 
trustees of an institution chartered by the state for educational purposes, 
the trustees of a private university have a fiduciary duty to ensure that 
the institution fulfils its educational objectives. This is, however, only a 
broad, general duty and there are no explicit stipulations regarding the 
substance of those objectives and the ways in which they should be 
accomplished. Much the same is true of the regents of state universities, 
although the enabling legislation may be somewhat more detailed. States 
do create institutions for particular purposes, e.g. engineering schools, 
community colleges and four-year colleges, but that is also true of 
private higher educational institutions. As far as internal organisation is 
concerned, the prevailing law in the United States leaves that largely in 
the discretion of the trustees or the regents and their delegates. 
Universities and the Outside World 
In the eyes of the law, a private university is not much different from 
any other private enterprise. It is subject to labour laws, environmental 
protection laws and a host of other regulations just as are International 
Business Machines and General Motors. To be sure, most educational 
institutions in the United States benefit from certain tax laws but with 
these advantages come other regulations. Exemption from income and 
property taxation is a governmental recognition of the special value of 
universities which they share with churches, art museums and charities. 
In order to retain its exemption from taxation, a university must adhere 
to regulations promulgated by the Internal Revenue Service having to 
do with programmes of "affirmative action", and with other policies 
designed to eradicate the application in appointments of discriminatory 
criteria such as race and sex. These regulations are in addition to and 
are often different from those imposed by other agencies pursuant to 
other laws. Indeed, an institution may violate a regulation of the 
Internal Revenue Service on racial discrimination without violating any 
other law or regulation of the state or federal government. Enterprises 
operated for profit which are not entitled to exemption from taxation do 
not have to comply with these regulations. 
The case of Bob Jones University is a good example. 9 The university 
lost its tax exemption after a long legal contest because it followed 
various racially discriminatory policies. The governing body and 
administrators of Bob Jones University argued that they ought to be free 
to base their internal policies on their religious beliefs, which prohibited 
certain kinds of interracial social activities. The United States Supreme 
Court agreed that Bob Jones University, in general, could set what 
9 461 U.S. ,574 (1983). 
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policies it liked for student activities on campus, for example, it might 
prohibit black and white students from "dating" with one another--but it 
could not do so and still claim the benefit of exemption from taxation. 1~ 
The university, of course, remained subject to those antidiscrimination 
laws of general application, such as the laws guaranteeing an equal 
opportunity for employment. In the view of the Supreme Court there 
was a significant difference between the mere toleration of private racial 
discrimination and implicit governmental approval through the grant of 
an exemption from taxation. This does not mean that every act of an 
institution exempt from taxation is subject to governmental review. 
Many groups with unusual or eccentric interests are granted such 
exemptions. However, the government will scrutinise certain institutional 
actions to which it attributes overriding importance to be sure that they 
are not inconsistent with the government's own social policies. Racial 
discrimination is one of those issues that gives rise to heightened 
governmental scrutiny. 1~ 
The case of Bob Jones University illustrates the degree to which the 
federal government is unwilling to renounce its recently claimed 
regulatory control over private educational institutions. Very few 
universities in the United States have overtly "racist" policies such as 
those of Bob Jones University, and that case may have little impact on 
other institutions. Certainly there is a great deal of merit in the argument 
that the government should not implicitly support racially discriminatory 
policies, but the regulations of the Internal Revenue Service are written 
in broad language and they could, in principle, provide a basis for 
investigating a significant number of institutions. 12 The loss of the 
exemption from taxation by a university could be devastating. It carries 
a double penalty. First, the institution has to pay taxes on its income. 
The costs of operation are usually equal to or exceed the income, and 
the burden of the payment of taxes would be felt primarily by marginal 
programmes, although these might make the difference between the 
mediocrity and the distinction of a university. More importantly, a 
a0 Refusal of admission by reason of race might raise other problems. In a decision in 
1976 the United States Supreme Court ruled that parents of a child denied admission to a 
private school by reason of his race could sue for damages under one of the civil rights 
statutes passed shortly after the Civil War. The law provided that blacks should enjoy all 
the rights of private contract enjoyed by whites, which the Supreme Court understood to 
outlaw racial discrimination in the making of a private contract. Title 42, United States Code, 
section 1981; Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976). 
11 Cases involving so-called "segregation academies" provide other examples. See, e.g., 
Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455 (1973) (Mississippi could not subsidise textbook costs 
for private, racially segregated schools.); Brown v. Dade Christian Schools, Inc., 556 F.2d 
310 (5th Cir. 1977) (en banc), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1063 (1978). (A school associated 
with a church failed to prove that its racially discriminatory policies were an expression of 
a genuinely held religious tenet.) 
iz See Revenue Ruling 71-447, 1971-2 Cumulative Bulletin 230; Revenue Ruling 74- 
231, 1975-1 Cumulative Bulletin 158; Revenue Procedure 75-50, 1975-2 Cumulative 
Bulletin 587; Internal Revenue Code section 501(c)(3). 
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donor will not be able to take a "charitable deduction" from his income- 
tax payment for a gift to an institution which is not exempt from the 
obligation to pay taxes. This would dissuade many private donors, and it 
would make gifts by most private foundations and all public agencies 
illegal. Although ad valorem property taxation is a matter of state and 
local law, it is often the case that exemption from property taxes goes 
hand in hand with exemption from federal and state income taxation. 
Most universities own physical plants of substantial value and the annual 
property tax bill could be overwhelming. Indeed, the loss of exemption 
from taxation would probably be a death-blow to most universities. The 
threat is great enough that it has an indirect effect on internal university 
policies even if the Internal Revenue Service only challenges those 
institutions that engage in easily detectable forms of discrimination, such 
as Bob Jones University. 
A c a d e m i c  A u t o n o m y ,  A c a d e m i c  Freedom and Academic  Se l f -Government  
In general, however, both the federal government and state 
governments in the United States practice a far-reaching tolerance of 
institutional autonomy. Academic standards and discipline come 
immediately to mind. Courts and other governmental agencies defer to 
universities in almost all matters of academic standards. The only time 
that the government itself has entered into such cases is when the matter 
of academic standards is bound up in another matter such as racial or 
sexual discrimination. 13 The result is much the same in disciplinary 
cases, although a state-supported university, as an agency of the state, 
may be required to meet certain minimal procedural standards of "due 
process"; it cannot take away a right or revoke a privilege without due 
process, although this may not amount to much more than notice and an 
opportunity to be heard. 14 The reasoning behind the reluctance of the 
courts and other agencies to intrude into matters of discipline or academic 
standards was succinctly stated by a federal court sitting in Vermont: 
[I]n matters of scholarship, the school authorities are uniquely qualified by 
training and experience to judge the qualifications of a student, and efficiency of 
instruction depends in no small degree upon the school faculty's freedom from 
interference from other non-educational tribunals. 15 
Laws which regulate the conditions of appointment have permitted 
greater governmental interference in the appointment and promotion of 
the academic staff of universities; in general, however, external bodies 
13 See, e.g., Board of Curators v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78 (1978). 
14 See, e.g., Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975). 
15 Connelly v. University of Vermont, 244 F.Supp. 156, 160 (D.Vt. 1965). See also, 
Mahavongsanan v. Hall, 529 F.2d 448 (5th Cir. 1976); Slaughter v. Brigham Young 
University, 514 F.2d 622 (10th Cir. 1975); Jansen v. Emory University, 440 F.Supp. 1060 
(N.D. Ga. 1977). 
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are reluctant to impose their own views on internal academic 
assessments. 16 In clerical and custodial positions the university is an 
employer just as any other enterprise and is held to conformity with the 
laws requiring "equal opportunity" and "affirmative action". 
Much of the tradition of academic freedom and much of the law on 
the subject has been formed in the course of the resolution of disputes 
between individual academics on one side and governments, public 
opinion or university administrators on the other. 17 The substance of 
these controversies has changed with the times. The freedom of the 
individual academic to teach the subject of his competence according to 
his scientific and scholarly convictions in the university in which he holds 
an appointment is a special variant of academic self-government. It 
en t a i l s  the self-government of the individual, his specific academic 
freedom, but not the collective self-government of the academic staff in 
the making of decisions which affect the institution as a whole or a 
significant unit of it, such as a department or a professional school. As 
an employee of the university, a teacher must follow the ordinary rules 
of contract in his teaching. That is, he may have a great deal of freedom 
to decide on the style of his teaching and the interpretation of the 
subject to his competence, but he is not free to ignore the substance of 
his courses. He would not be regarded as entitled to the protection of 
academic freedom if, having been appointed to teach demography, he 
lectured on astrophysics and demanded that his lectures and examinations 
in that field should be required of all students in the physical sciences. 
The withholding from such a teacher of the protection of academic 
freedom for his teaching of astrophysics could be done within any 
pattern of university government, be it presidential or departmental. 
16 See Hunter, Howard O., "Federal Antibias Legislation and Academic Freedom: 
Some Problems with Enforcement Procedures", Emory Law Journal, XXVII (Summer 
1978), pp. 609-671; O'Neil, R., "God and Government at Yale: The Limits of Federal 
Regulation of Higher Education", University o f  Cincinnati Law Review, XLIV (Summer 
1975), pp. 525-547; "Academic Freedom and Federal Regulation of University Hiring", 
(Note) Harvard Law Review, XCII (1979), pp. 878-897. The recent decision of the United 
States Supreme Court in Hishon v. King & Spalding, - -  U.S. - - ,  104 S. Ct. 2229 
(1984) may have some impact on appointments and promotions. The practical significance 
of this decision in a university is that a complaint which charges racial, sexual or other 
discrimination in appointments or promotions can give rise to lengthy and expensive 
litigation, even if there is no substantial factual basis for the allegations of discrimination. 
17 See, e.g., Ollman v. Toll, 518 F.Supp. 1196 (D. Md. 1981). Professor Ollman, who 
held an appointment with permanence of tenure at another institution, was recommended 
by the members of the department of political science at the University of Maryland for a 
professorship and the chairmanship of the department. The president of the university 
refused to accept the recommendation of appointment. Ollman brought suit but lost, 
largely on grounds derived from the law of contract. Professor Ollman argued that the 
Maryland administration abused his academic freedom by failing to approve his appointment 
because of his professed Marxism; he did not demonstrate that a university in which he 
never held an academic appointment could restrict his academic freedom. See also, 
Hunter, Howard O., "Curriculum, Pedagogy, and the Constitutional Rights of Teachers 
in Secondary Schools", William and Mary Law Review, XXV (Fall 1983), pp. 1-79. 
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Universities in the United States enjoy a reasonable degree of 
autonomy despite continuing concern about regulatory burdens. The 
same holds true for individual academics. This tells us something about 
the public status of universities and those who hold appointments in 
them. It also tells us something about the powers of and restraints on 
governments in their dealings with universities. It tells us how much 
autonomy the university and its members  have vis-d-vis the external 
powers of state, church, business and political parties; but it tells us little 
about how the authority should be distributed wf~hin the university in 
order  to assure their attention to their proper  obj'ectives: the pursuit and 
the communication of the truths of all the disciplines within them. 
American law is of little assistance in this matter. In one significant 
case, the United States Supreme Court ruled that the teaching staff of 
Yeshiva University were the "managers" of the university and not its 
"labourers" within the meaning of the federal laws on labour-management 
relations and the organisation of trade unions. TM In describing the policies 
of the National Labor  Relations Act as applied to universities, Justice 
Powell, who wrote the opinion of the Court, said: 
The Act was intended to accommodate the type of management-employee 
relations that prevail in the pyramidal hierarchies of private industry . . .  In 
contrast, authority in the typical "mature" private university is divided between 
a central administration and one or more collegial bodies . . .  This system of 
"shared authority" evolved from the medieval model of collegial decision making 
in which guilds of scholars were responsible only to themselves . . .  At early 
universities the faculty were the school. Although faculties have been subject to 
external control in the United States since colonial times, traditions of collegiality 
continue to play a significant role at many universities, including Yeshiva. For 
these reasons, the Board has recognized that principles developed for use in the 
industrial setting cannot be imposed blindly on the academic w o r l d .  19 
The decision in the Yeshiva case was so closely tied to the facts of 
Yeshiva's own traditions and customs of internal government that it 
provided little guidance for other  cases, which might involve larger or 
more formally organised universities in which the academic staff had not 
had such intimate participation in the making of policy. Yet the case did 
suggest a judicial tendency to assume that academics were parts of the 
"management"  and that this was an appropriate way to conduct the 
internal affairs of a university. 
Nevertheless, in the case of Minnesota  State Board  f o r  C o m m u n i t y  
Colleges v.  Knight ,  2~ the United States Supreme Court  in 1984 expressly 
rejected the argument that there is any constitutional basis for an 
assertion that the teaching staff should participate in the government of 
18 NLRB v. Yeshiva University, 444 U.S. 672 (1980). See also the decision of the New 
York National Labor Relations Board, in "University Teachers and Trade Unions", 
Minerva, XXII (Spring 1984), pp. 96-115. 
19 NLRB v; Yeshiva University, loc. cit., pp. 680-681. 
20 _ _  U.S. , i04 S. Ct. 1058 (1984). 
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a university. 21 The court voted by a narrow majority in that case. The 
dissenting justices argued that the constitutional protection for speech, 
and by extension, for academic freedom, extends to internal university 
government as well. 22 The case had a number of peculiarities that make 
its application to universities in the future somewhat uncertain. 23 One 
thing, however, is clear. The federal government has thus far recognised 
the significant difference between concentrated and dispersed distributions 
of authority within universities, but it offers no constitutional guarantee 
of the latter. 
The answer to the question regarding the proper distribution of 
authority within a university cannot therefore come from arguments 
presented as authoritative in public law. To determine the proper role of 
the academic staff in university government, we should examine other 
considerations and agruments, some theoretical and some practical. Two 
positions taken on this question by persons who have recently discussed 
university government fall roughly into certain large categories which 
might be designated as "the argument from the principle of private 
property" and "the argument from the principle of representation of 
interests". This classification is neither rigorous nor exhaustive. 
The Argument from the Principle o f  Private Property 
Proponents of this approach to the analysis of the structure of 
universities begin with a theory o f  property. They speak of the rights, 
21 Ibid. p. 1,065; "The Constitution, Academic Self-Government and Academic Trade 
Unions in American State Universities and Colleges", Minerva, XXII (Summer-Autumn 
1983), pp. 296-319. 
22 Justice Brennan filed a separate diss.enting opinion in which he said that, "If the First 
Amendment is truly to protect the 'free play of the spirit' within our institutions of higher 
learning . . . .  then the faculty at those institutions must be able to participate effectively 
in the discussion of such matters as, for example, curriculum reform, degree requirements, 
student affairs, new facilities, and budgetary planning." Ibid., p. 1~072. Justice Stevens 
filed another dissenting opinion. Justices Brennan and Powell were not in complete 
agreement with Justice Stevens, but all three agreed that the academic staff should 
participate in unlversity government. Ibid., p. 1,074. Justice Marshall voted with the 
majority, but he did not join the majority opinion. Instead, he filed a separate opinion in 
which he seemed to be in general agreement with Justices Brennan, Poweli and Stevens 
about the role of the academic staff in university government. In his view, however, the 
academic staff at the Minnesota Community Colleges were not excluded from participation 
in the making of policy. Ibid., p. 1,070. 
z~ The academic staff had already been organised into a trade union. The dispute had to 
do with a state law that limited official bargaining to meetings between representatives of 
the state and the designated bargaining unit of the union. Academic staff-members who 
chose not to be members of the trade union argued that they were excluded from 
university government because there was no provision for them to confer with representatives 
of the state. As a matter of fact, there were no restraints on communications between 
individual staff-members and state representatives; there was simply no official means of 
negotiation. There was no history of academic self-government as there had been in the 
case of Yeshiva University. The latter was a private, independent university of respected 
academic quahty that had been in existence for a number of years; the other was a state- 
supported community college of relatively recent creation and of a very marginal status as 
an academic institution. 
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interests and privileges which are associated with the institution of 
property. The university teacher sells his intellectual services, which are 
part of his private property, to the university in return for a salary, a 
room, the use of a library and laboratory, and other perquisites. The 
university sells or rents its assets and services to students and other 
users. The whole enterprise works much the same as any other enterprise 
engaging in exchanges of goods and services for other goods and 
services. Control of the property remains with the owners. Just as any 
other owners of property may bargain away all or some of the power of 
control, so may the "owners" of the university. 
In this scheme it is necessary to decide who owns the university. The 
short answer is that, legally, the state owns state universities and the 
trustees own private universities. The state and the trustees, therefore, 
have the power to determine the policies and to make particular 
decisions within the universities. The state cannot violate private rights 
in the management of the state universities, 24 but it does not have to 
include the teachers among the participants in the making of policy. 
Similarly, the trustees can run the university as they see fit so long as 
they abide by laws of general application and their own contractual 
obligations. 
To whom are these owners responsible? The "managers" who act on 
behalf of the state have to bear political realities in mind. There may be 
a considerable insulation between the regents of a state university and 
the electorate of the state, but there is, nevertheless, a connection and 
the regents cannot ignore it. Somewhat similar constraints have a 
limiting effect on the freedom of the trustees of a private university to 
make decisions, but there are usually not as many different demands to 
satisfy as there are in the electorate. The most important voices may be 
those of important private patrons. Certainly that was the case in the 
nineteenth century when major private benefactors sometimes exerted 
influence on the trustees, 25 at a time when trustees themselves played a 
part more frequently and more particularly in the government of the 
university than they do nowadays. 
Most private universities have had generous patrons in recent decades 
who have refrained from intrusion into the internal government of the 
university, 26 and, with some exceptions, state boards of regents have 
protected state universities from gross political intrusions. The argument 
from the principle of property, despite its elaboration in law, leaves little 
room for arguments in favour of the participation of the academic staff 
24 See, e.g., Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972). 
25 See, e.g., Manne, Henry G., "The Political Economy of Modem Universities", in 
Burleigh, A. G. (ed.), Education in a Free Society (Indianapolis: Liberty Press, 1973), 
pp. 165-205. 
26 The University of Chicago, Vanderbilt University, Duke University, Washington 
University, and Emory University--all private universities---have received enormous gifts 
from individuals or families; each has flourished as an autonomous institution. 
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in the government of the university. It is but a short step to the 
proposition that the regents or the trustees have absolute control over 
appointments, promotions and admissions, as well as curricula and 
standards. The argument from property is closely related to the concept 
of the university as a "market". That is, the owners of the property 
should be free to sell their products in accordance with the demand for 
those products in the market. If there are many students clamouring for 
courses in business administration and few who wish to study Latin, then 
the trustees are justified in abolishing the department of classics and 
greatly expanding the business school. 
There is probably no university in the United States which is entirely 
free from traces of the conception of the university as private property. 
It is widely accepted that he who pays the piper calls the tune. 
Nevertheless, a tradition which has evolved over the past half century has 
disposed the trustees and the regents to defer to academic administrators 
and academic members of the university on most matters of academic 
policy. Whatever the tradition, however, academics cannot draw support 
from the argument from the principle of property for the participation of 
the teaching staff in the government of universities. The teachers are not 
the owners; they are simply persons who contract with the owners for 
the provision of intellectual services in return for salary and associated 
perquisites. 
The argument for allowing the market or "social needs" to determine the 
decisions of university government: There is a sub-category of the 
argument from property that is based in arguments of economic 
efficiency. It can be designated as the "entrepreneurial argument" 
because of the importance attached to the mechanism of the market. In 
this view, the university is like a business enterprise. Its products are 
educated students and the results of research. The academic staff are the 
workers, the graduates and papers or books written by the academic 
staff are the products, and the administrators of the university are the 
managers. 
There is a body of opinion espoused by would-be reformers of higher 
education which asserts that universities should be run on the principle 
of a profit-seeking business finn. Liberal economists who prize the 
market would leave such determination to the mechanisms of the 
market; they also tend to look at the university as a factory that can 
produce engineers, scientists and research on particular topics in 
accordance with demands expressed in the market-place, z7 The proponents 
of the university as an institution seeking to pay its way through the 
27 See, e.g,, Meiners, Roger G., "The Political Economy of Higher Education", 
presented at a seminar on the Political Economy of Higher Education sponsored by the 
Liberty Fund and the Law and Economics Centre of Emory University, 22-24 October, 
1982. 
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mechanism of the market in a market economy do not ordinarily discuss 
problems of the internal government of universities. It may be inferred, 
however, that they do not see collective self-government by the teaching 
staff as a whole as any more desirable than "self-management" in 
business. Oddly enough, there is a closely related view in certain 
European countries where central educational bureaucracies and 
educationists of socialistic inclinations sometimes try to plan, or at 
least recommend the planning of, curricula and research activities around 
ostensible "social needs". 2s 
This conception of the university certainly has some elements of truth 
in it. Universities do respond to the demands of the market; they also 
respond to "social needs", especially if they are made loudly and are 
coupled with political demands and with the prospect of grants from 
governments and private foundations to pay for them. Departments in 
South-east Asian studies, "black studies", and "women's studies" were 
direct responses to the agitation around the war in Vietnam, the 
movement for civil rights, and the "women's movement". South-east 
Asian studies was an example of response to governmental decision and 
the market. The federal government wanted more knowledge of the 
area and more experts, so it made available a large amount of money to 
provide the knowledge and the experts. The clamour over the war made 
the area one of interest to students who created a separate demand for 
courses dealing with the politics and economics of Indochina. Many 
students were no doubt attracted because the intense public agitation 
directed their minds to it in the i960s; others probably saw the subject 
as one offering good prospects for a professional career. Now that 
American participation in the war is over, many of these departments 
have gone out of existence. 29 
Whether there is a preference for central planning for the satisfaction 
of "social needs" or for the making of decisions in the light of demands 
in the market, this argument still looks at the university in purely 
utilitarian terms as a producer of goods and services to meet the 
demands of the larger society. This view of the university is not wholly 
28 See, Centre for Educational Research and Innovation, "Relationships between Higher 
Education and the Community: Towards a Redefinition of the Functions of Higher 
Education", (Paris: CERI/CD, 1978), (78), 12; Ibid., "Summary and Conclusions of an 
International Conference on Higher Education and the Community: New Partnerships and 
Interactions", (Paris: CERI/CD, 1980), (80), 12; See also Hunter, Howard O., "Universities 
and the Needs of Local and Regional Communities: Comments on the Outlook of the 
Centre for Educational Research and Innovation of the Organisation for Economic Co- 
operation and Development", Minerva XVIII (Winter 1980), pp. 624-643. Pedersen, 
Mogens and Hunter, Howard O., Recent Reforms in Swedish Higher Education (Stockholm: 
Ratio Press, 1980), and Reports and Documents, Minerva, XVIII (Summer 1980), 
pp. 324--351. 
29 See generally, Winks, Robin W., "Government and the University in the United 
States", in Chapman, John W. (ed.), The Western University on Trial (Berkeley: The 
University of California Press, 1983), pp. 184-197. 
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unreasonable; it is also attractive to legislators who must answer to the 
taxpaying electorate, because if its validity is accepted then the numbers 
of graduates in practical subjects and of applied science research projects 
can be used as tangible evidence of the value obtained for the revenues 
provided by the taxpayers. The average taxpayer may not be as 
sympathetic to the study of the theory of twelve-tone music, or Sanskrit, 
or the common law in medieval England. Trustees and administrators of 
private universities who, in order to meet the expenses of their 
university, must seek the money supplied by fee-paying students or by 
grant-awarding bodies, may also be tempted to emphasise those 
programmes of ostensibly immediate utility to those who pay fees or 
award grants. 
There is a danger that devotion to the central task of the university 
may be put aside in the pursuit of short-term goals, the demands of the 
labour market or of social and technological "needs". This seems 
obvious but the obvious sometimes does not seem to be evident to 
educational planners and reformers. There is strong support for the ideal 
of the university as a simple producer of goods and services that can be 
adapted to changing demands as anticipated by the planners, or as they 
are expressed in forces working in the market. 
The conception of  the university as a business corporation: Many of the 
observers who regard the university in this way also see it as a corporate 
entity somewhat similar to a large business corporation. In the large 
corporation, legal ownership of the enterprise lies with the shareholders, 
but because they are so numerous, the directors act as their surrogates 
and as fiduciaries for their interests. In reality, the daily exercise of 
authority is entrusted to the managers, although they serve at the 
pleasure of the board and can be dismissed by the board. The objective 
is the maximisation of profits. Despite an occasional eccentric, there is a 
consensus of interest among the shareholders, directors and managers in 
making a profit. Even the workers share this general goal because they 
want the corporation to be successful enough to assure them regular 
employment at good wages. They might prefer higher wages and lower 
executive salaries or dividends, but, in any case, the profits have to be 
there to keep the enterprise going. 
The university is, however, a very different kind of institution. 
Although legal ownership is vested in the lay board of trustees, they do 
not serve with the expectation of increasing their own profits. To be 
sure, public service of this sort carries a number of intangible benefits 
and may also provide a means for increasing business contacts, but 
directors of a business corporation are  usually paid, usually have 
substantial stockholdings in the company, and are subject to a wide 
range of regulatory statutes. There is a clear connection between their 
roles as directors and the profit-making purposes of the enterprise. 
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Trustees of a university are most unlikely to have any financial interest 
in the institution. 
Professor Henry Manne, a lawyer and an economist, has argued that 
the university should be organised as a profit-making enterprise with the 
academic staff holding shares in the corporation. In his view this would 
make the enterprise responsive to the market so that the market- 
approach could work effectively. It would, according to Professor 
Manne, make the interests of the teachers and the institution coincide 
and thus would improve efficiency. The tasks of university government 
would also be simpler because the form of organisation most efficient for 
the maximisation of profit would be the correct one to choose. In that 
sense the model of the business corporation would be relevant to the 
question of the distribution of authority. 3~ 
Professor Manne's arguments have been criticised by another lawyer, 
Professor John Hetherington, who has argued that his approach is 
insensitive to the varied interests at work within a university, many of 
which cannot be measured in an economically rational manner. In 
Professor Hetherington's view, the objectives of the university are too 
broad to fit within a simple model of economic efficiency which is based 
on the market made up of firms operating for profit. The university is a 
conservator of values as well as a training ground for a professional 
career. 31 
Professor Hetherington's arguments certainly describe the traditional 
understanding of the university more accurately than Professor Manne's, 
and it is unlikely that any major institution is going to change its form 
into that of a profit-making enterprise. Professor Manne's arguments are 
useful in that they bring out more clearly many of the inefficiencies in 
the ordinary operations of universities. 
The conception of the university as a business corporation in a system 
of private property does not entirely exclude the academic staff from 
participation in university government, but it does limit the scope of its 
participation in the really important decisions. Furthermore, it provides 
no principled basis, other than efficiency, for participation by members 
of the academic staff in university government. 
Some members of academic staffs seem to share this idea of the 
university. These include the more active members of academic trade 
unions who look upon the university as a work-place in which the 
administrators are the managers with whom the teachers must bargain 
about working conditions and remuneration. There is an element of 
truth in this approach, but it begs the question of who constitutes the 
3o Manne, H. G., op. cit., note 22. 
3a Hetherington, John A. C., "Commentary on Political Economy of Higher Education", 
presented at a seminar on The Political Economy of Higher Education sponsored by the 
Liberty Fund and the Law and Economics Centre of Emory University, 22-24 October, 
1982. 
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university. It reduces the teachers to the status of hired hands who do 
what the administrators pay them to do. 
The Argument from the Principle of Representation of Interests 
In Europe, there has been a movement to "democratise" the 
universities, the initiative coming from politicians, governments and 
educational publicists and promoters associated with international 
organisations. This has meant accommodating in the universities the 
offspring of social strata who had previously gone without higher 
education. In the United States where the offspring of the lower and 
middle classes were for a long time more likely to attend university than 
was the case in Europe, there has been a concurrent demand to increase 
the percentage of students coming from "ethnic minorities". In Europe, 
unlike the United States, the movement to democratise the universities 
by widening the social range of its admission of students has been 
followed by a strong demand for the "internal democratisation" of the 
universities. This has meant a greater degree of equality in the 
distribution of authority within the university. This egalitarian view has 
sometimes been reinforced by a conception of the university as a 
collectivity made up of various groups each of which has an "interest" of 
its own which is in conflict with the interests of the other groups. This 
has entailed the inclusion of junior teachers, students, and auxiliary 
non-academic employees of universities in their governing bodies. In the 
United States in particular and in Great Britain the demand for the 
inclusion of students in governing bodies of the university was made by 
students themselves in the late 1960s, but the demands faded away 
before there were any real changes in the typical forms of university 
government. Both before and after the 1960s there have been student 
representatives on a number of governing committees throughout most 
universities so that they have not been completely without a voice in the 
government of the university. 
A distinguishing factor of the egalitarian interest-group conception of 
the university is the explicit rejection of a hierarchical distribution of 
authority. Although the conception of the university as private property 
does not directly refer to a particular form of organisation, it does imply 
a hierarchical distribution of authority with the "owners" at the pinnacle. 
The egalitarian interest-group conception increases the power of junior 
teachers and students, and, in some cases, extends power to custodial 
and clerical workers. This kind of university government has now been 
adopted in a number of continental European countries. 
Because the egalitarian interest-group concept of the university rejects 
a hierarchical distribution of authority, the role of the senior members 
of governing bodies has been much reduced in those universities where 
at one time academic self-government meant government by full or 
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ordinary professors. (It should be noted in passing that in Europe in the 
nineteenth century when academic self-government became enshrined as 
an article of academic faith, full or ordinary professors did in fact make 
up a larger fraction of the teaching staff than they have in the period 
after the Second World War.) In such universities academic self- 
government of the traditional Germanic type has been generally 
diminished in favour of government by the students, the administrators 
and the auxiliary staff, and academic considerations have, in principle, 
become less dominant. By dint of personal charisma or force of 
personality, individual professors can still have a pronounced voice in 
the egalitarian government of the university, but much time, energy and 
sophistication in the art of politics are needed for this. Many university 
teachers in the continental "tripartite" systems have withdrawn from 
participation in the governing bodies of their universities. 
The merits of the egalitarian view of the desirable distribution of 
authority in universities must be acknowledged. Universities have in fact 
excluded groups of well-qualified teachers from their governing bodies. 
Even in Germany where academic self-government meant self-government 
by the full or ordinary professors, professors have not always been wise 
in their policies. Courses of study have occasionally become obsolete and 
have not been revised in the light of new developments in particular 
disciplines. Research has often been pedestrian or sometimes even 
incompetent. The auxiliary staff has not infrequently been slighted, 
overworked or underpaid. Students have sometimes been treated in a 
cavalier fashion. It is by no means wholly unreasonable to suggest that 
students, teachers at ranks lower than full professors, and others who 
are affected by the university should have some voice in the making of 
policies of the university in matters on which they are competent to 
speak and which affect them. This does not mean, however, that every 
person or group who is affected by the university should participate 
equally in the making of all decisions. 
The Model of the Church 
There is little mention made these days of the church as a model for 
the distribution of authority within a university. This ignores the history 
of many close relationships between universities and churches. In 
general, there are two models of church organisation. One is the 
hierarchical model of the traditional churches with various strata of 
authority all flowing from a central locus within the episcopate and the 
papacy. The other might be called the "democratic" model of protestant 
sects or denominations such as the Congregationalists and the Baptists 
who had rejected the hierarchical model. These are rough descriptions, 
and there are churches which do not fit easily within one category or 
another. The Methodist Church, for example, developed from the 
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Church of England and has an episcopal hierarchy, but in actual practice 
the Methodist Church has many of the earmarks of the sectarian 
democratic model. The Presbyterian Church fits within the democratic 
model in its general approach to church organisation, but at the same 
time it has a great deal more central control than exists in denominations 
such as the Baptists. 
In the hierarchical churches there may be a good deal of autonomy in 
the normal operations of the lower strata of the hierarchy. That is, the 
parish priest and lay parishioners may be generally left alone in the 
making of decisions about running the parish. There is less dispersion of 
authority in making decisions on matters of more important policy, and 
especially on matters of theological importance. Of course, this varies 
greatly among the hierarchical churches. The Pope wields far more 
authority in the Roman Catholic Church than does the presiding bishop 
of the Protestant Episcopal Church of America, or his nominal superior, 
the Archbishop of Canterbury; the form of internal organisation of the 
churches which make up the Anglican communion is quite similar to 
that of the Church of Rome. 
In the "democratic" sects or denominations each member, loosely 
speaking, is a minister of God, and each stands on an equal footing with 
each other minister. There may be---indeed there usually is--a pastor, 
but he is selected by the congregation--"called" to the church--rather 
than being appointed or ordained to the position by a bishop or some 
other senior ecclesiastical official. Each congregation is autonomous, and 
various congregations are bound together into a denomination by a set 
of generally agreed upon principles and by a loose compact. The 
congregations are not members of a single unit, as a parish is a 
subdivision of one "holy, catholic, and apostolic church". Rather, the 
congregations are equal members of a confederation which they freely 
joined and which they may freely leave upon a vote of their members. 
Instead of a hierarchy of strata moving upward from laymen through 
deacons, priests, bishops and archbishops, there are no strata except as 
created by compacts for purposes of efficiency of operation and these 
may be changed from time to time. 
There is little question that the prevailing model in university 
organisation has been the hierarchical one. A strong president, or 
rector, backed by the trustees, or some other type of lay governing body, 
can have the power of a bishop. The professorial stratum occupies a 
position akin to that of senior members of the clergy with junior 
members of the academic staff filling the roles of deacons, curates, and 
novices. One might conceive of the students as lay members of the 
congregation, from whom a few are chosen to study further for the 
priesthood. 
Both the hierarchical and the congregational patterns of church 
government, different though churches are from universities, offer more 
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illuminating guidance to a discussion of the proper form of government 
than do the patterns derived from the analysis of the market and the 
business corporation, or from the principles of political and social 
equality and of class conflict. The reasons for this are not far to seek. 
The churches are concerned with ideal ends, the salvation of souls and 
the realisation of ethical rules which are derived from a theological 
doctrine. The universities too are concerned with ideal ends, t h e  
advancement of knowledge and the maintenance and improvement of 
intellectual traditions and the moral traditions associated with them. Of 
course, universities must also serve some of the practical ends of society 
and they must manage to "pay their own way" or "make ends meet", 
but scarcely through the sale of their services. It is these latter 
considerations which make it not irrelevant to examine private property, 
the market and the business corporation as models, but each of them 
lacks a vital feature which the churches possess as a model for university 
government. 
The Teaching Staff as a Governing Body 
The particular functions of the university, with the legal as well as 
traditional respect for academic freedom, provide the basis for an 
argument that the academic staff should be the principal governors of 
the university. Academic self-government is no panacea for the ills of 
universities. Sometimes it may be worse than government by an 
enlightened board of trustees or a benevolently despotic president. It is, 
however, a better way to insure the long-term pursuit of the central 
ideals of the university. 
There is no need to make a firm and limiting definition of the 
academic staff. There are differences among institutions that would 
justify greater or less inclusiveness. In general, however, the academic 
staff should include all those who are normally so identified--professors, 
associate professors, readers, lecturers, assistant professors--together 
with those who are directly involved with one or more of the principal 
functions of the university, for example, instructors or research workers 
on short-term appointments. The question remains as to where the outer 
boundaries should be drawn but there must be boundaries. 
Many modern universities, including almost all of the major institutions 
of the United States, have grown from the outside in. They are 
the products of decisions made by politicians, churches, or private 
benefactors to create ab ovo new centres of higher education. Unlike 
the German professors, the professorial stratum in the United States had 
relatively little direct governing authority in most universities until the 
twentieth century. The model of university and college government in 
the United States well into the twentieth century was one of a strong 
president usually backed by an active board of trustees. The inclusion of 
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the professorial stratum, as well as others, in the exercise of governing 
authority has occurred mainly within the last 50 years. 
The German model of university government by the academic staff, 
primarily by the professorial stratum, has, nevertheless, had a strong 
influence. It often seems to be considered to be the norm, despite the 
varying histories of universities in different countries. This was certainly 
apparent in the opinion of the United States Supreme Court in the case 
of the Yeshiva University when Justice Powell wrote: "Guilds of scholars 
were responsible only to themselves . . .  At early universities, the 
faculty were the s c h o o l .  ''32 Yet even in times of the greatest autonomy, 
the German universities did not operate in a vacuum answerable only to 
themselves. They were still subject to ultimate control by the state 
government in the form of the state university law and the powers of the 
minister in professional appointments. Similarly, the guilds of medieval 
scholars and teachers who gathered together in various continental 
European centres to form the institutions that grew into Europe's 
modern universities were generally subject to the control of both church 
and state. Many of the members of the academic staffs were clerics, and 
they were bound by their oaths and their faith to abide by the teachings 
of the church. During the Reformation, many institutions became 
embroiled in the political and religious conflicts that occurred throughout 
Europe, and whatever their traditional models of internal government, 
they became subject, as a practical matter, to the exercise of power by 
external authorities, both princely and ecclesiastical. 
There is no doubt that the German model has had and continues to 
have a powerful influence on thinking about the organisation as well as 
the purposes of universities. Authority in the German universities was 
exercised through academic self-government; it was collective self- 
government in which all full professors had an equal share at a time 
when most of the teaching was done by professors. It was not complete 
collective self-government. There was a legal framework--the university 
law--imposed from the outside by the government of the state; there 
was also the Kurator, an official appointed by the ministry of education 
in each state to administer the finances and property of the university. 
Nevertheless, within these restrictions--restrictions to the professorial 
stratum, restrictions by the university law and by the role of the 
Kurator--the German universities were ruled by their teachers acting 
collectively through their Fakultaten and their senate. This precedent 
has become established as an ideal of American universities, ever since 
American academics began to be aware of the German universities in 
the nineteenth century. 
There is an alternative form of the ideal of a widely dispersed 
distribution of authority in academic institutions. This is the pattern of 
32 N L R B  v. Yeshiva University, 444 U.S. 672, 680 (1980). 
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the colleges of Oxford and Cambridge. The pattern is one of nearly 
complete democracy bound only by college statutes and traditions. All 
fellows, except the most junior research fellow, have equal voting rights 
on all matters of college business. In practice, most decisions of 
importance are made by committees, but these decisions are, in principle, 
subject to the approval or disapproval of the "governing body" which is 
made up of all fellows, young and old, from the time they are first 
elected to a fellowship by the then governing body. It is interesting to 
speculate about why this much more "democratic" distribution of 
academic authority within a university never became as influential as the 
German model of organisation in American universities. The close 
relationship between Americans and British universities makes this an 
even more intriguing question. 
What are the issues that are most important in university government? 
The answer to this question may assist in determining the appropriate 
distribution of authority. Even the most ardent supporter of academic 
self-government in a large, complicated university will quickly realise 
that much of the business of an institution must and should best be left 
to full-time administrators. The German universities throughout much 
of the nineteenth century, except for the University of Berlin, were very 
small with fewer than 1,000 students in many places. The Oxford and 
Cambridge colleges were even smaller. Some bureaucratisation, with 
full-time administrators, is inevitable with increased size. 
One central ideal is common to all universities, large and small, 
namely the creation and the preservation of the conditions necessary for 
the free and self-disciplined pursuit and transmission of knowledge-- 
although the level of fulfilment varies considerably. This ideal means 
that both students and teachers should have as much intellectual freedom 
as possible in the cultivation of the ideal. Academic freedom does not 
mean freedom to be arbitrary or frivolous with regard to method or 
substance. Academic freedom is not freedom to be indifferent to severe 
standards which are difficult to define but urgent nonetheless. A teacher 
cannot be free to pursue his intellectual interests if he has to expend his 
energies on elementary education. 33 Standards of admission have a 
direct impact on the conditions for academic freedom. It goes without 
saying that decisions on appointments and promotions are critical to the 
quality and vitality of the institution. Sources of funds also may be 
important in their effect on the freedom of investigation. The decision to 
accept financial support from the government entails the acceptance of a 
host of regulations and record-keeping requirements. Joint ventures 
with business corporations may lead to diversions from the proper 
~3 Of course, a professor must be willing to teach the introductory course of  his 
discipline or a survey course for those students whose major interests lie elsewhere, but no 
university teacher should be required to teach at the secondary or elementary school level. 
Remedial  education is not a part of the central purposes of higher education. 
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objectives of a university. These are not reasons for rejecting such 
financial support, but they are reasons for being sure that they do not 
compromise t h e  university's main functions. Finally, the design of 
courses of study and syllabuses has a significant impact on the quality of 
the institution. There are any number of other issues that may be of 
more or less importance, but consistently the most significant are those 
which involve admissions, appointments and promotions, acquisition of 
financial support, and the curriculum. 
There are especially persuasive reasons why the authority for decisions 
on appointments and promotions should rest in departments or relatively 
small subdivisions of the total academic body. Learning has become so 
specialised that only scholars and scientists whose special knowledge is 
adjacent to or overlapping with that of candidates for appointments or 
promotions can render a reasonable and competent judgement. The 
same obtains for decisions about courses of study and the requirements 
for and the award of degrees. The further removed a decision is from 
the point of qualified knowledge the less sound it is likely to be. 
There are also good reasons for the dispersion of authority about the 
acceptability of certain sources of financial support and for policies 
regarding admissions of new students. Academics are usually concerned 
about the reputation and standing of the university and their respective 
departments, nationally and internationally. They will, therefore, at least 
theoretically be interested in maintaining and enhancing the standing of 
their university and their department by preventing the acceptance of 
"tainted money", and the admission of students whose poor performance 
will mar the reputation of their institution by degrading the standard of 
learning. 
Furthermore, in order to protect his own intellectual freedom, each 
member of the academic staff theoretically has an immediate interest in 
participating in decisions which might affect that freedom. If members of 
the academic staff abdicate this responsibility, or if they allow themselves 
to b e  excluded from participating in effective governing roles, no one 
else in the university will have the same interest in acting on behalf of 
their freedom to pursue their academic or intellectual ends. Continuing 
this line of argument, the university can only retain its integrity as a 
centre for the transmission and pursuit of truth if it maintains the 
conditions necessary for academic freedom to flourish. It is probably 
asking too much of trustees, administrators and others to expect them 
always to place the long-term protection of academic freedom first 
among their various concerns. 
It does not follow that the academic staff should have absolute control 
over the making of policy in these important areas. Certainly the 
president and the trustees of most institutions should not be subject to a 
power of veto by the academic staff over sources of funds. Similarly, 
there may be good reasons for establishing some criteria of admission 
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which are different from the criterion of proven academic merit. (This 
has been a regular feature of state-supported institutions in the United 
States, and not just for athletes. To a somewhat smaller extent the same 
is true of some private colleges and universities.) In matters of 
appointments and promotions, the president or other members of the 
administration and the trustees may provide a check on political 
partisanship and internal departmental politics in the making of 
appointments and promotions. Finally, the content of the curriculum 
may have to be arranged so as to take into account the requirements of 
examinations which are set by external bodies which determine admission 
to the practice of professions such as law, engineering and medicine. 
Similarly, an external body might fix the purpose of an institution. For 
example, a state or a municipality might establish a technical college for 
the training of agriculturalists and engineers. The academic staff 
appointed to teach those subjects could hardly argue with any justification 
that their powers of academic self-government are abrogated if they are 
prevented from transforming it into a liberal arts college, oriented to 
the preparation of their students for graduate work in pure science, 
humanities and social sciences. That might suit the intellectual interests 
of the teachers but it would not be in keeping with the legitimately 
designated purpose of that particular institution. 
Yet even if the members of the academic staff have some important 
role in the making of decisions about major policies, there can be little 
assurance that the university will inevitably preserve the conditions 
necessary for academic freedom, and, therefore, for the existence of the 
university as a centre of free intellectual activity. Likewise, complete 
academic self-government and departmental autonomy in the making of 
appointments with nothing more than an automatic confirmation of 
departmental reconamendations by deans or higher administrative 
authorities, cannot guarantee that the best candidates will be appointed, 
that political criteria will not be applied and that candidates who deviate 
from a prevailing fashion or political current will not be rejected, even if 
their intellectual merits and achievements are o ~ n g .  Nevertheless, 
the opposite is certainly not true. It is the academic staff, particularly 
the senior members, who have the training and the expertise to make 
reasoned decisions on matters such as appointments. There must be 
some element of trust that the members of the academic staff will use 
their training and knowledge responsibly. For this reason, it is wrong to 
think that the university can be governed without significant participation 
by the academic staff in the major decisions affecting the university as a 
whole, or its substantive divisions, such as departments or professional 
schools. 
Professor John Chapman has recently complained that academic staffs 
in the United States have not done well in governing themselves in a 
manner which fosters the effective performance of the functions of 
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universities. They have allowed considerations of personal attachment or 
political preference to obscure the assessment of intellectual merit. They 
have been frivolous in decisions about curricula and syllabuses. They 
have demanded permanence of tenure for persons of patent incompetence 
and indolence. They have misused the powers they have acquired. He 
thinks, therefore, that the person for setting things aright is the 
president. 34 
Even if all of Professor Chapman's criticisms of the present academic 
staffs in many American universities were true, that does not mean that 
the president should and can concentrate all authority in himself. 
Teachers in many American universities certainly did not behave 
admirably--to say the least---during the crises of the 1960s and 1970; 
academic staffs have suffered in recent years from rancorous internal 
conflicts, something arising from political partisanship. The failure to 
live up to their responsibilities does not mean, however, that academic 
staffs should have all authority to make or share in the making of 
decisions taken from them. The fact remains that academic staffs do 
have a genuine interest, which they do not always recognise or accept, 
in the protection and preservation of the university. They can act 
effectively in that interest only if they recognise it as their interest. If 
they do not genuinely care for discovery and teaching, they will neglect 
their responsibilities. Academic self-government, i.e., government by the 
teaching staff, is for those who have a sense of responsibility for 
discovery and teaching and for their university as the site of 
such activities. Academic self-government can nurture the sense of 
responsibility. 
In the present situation of the American university, the president has 
an extraordinary variety of tasks, all of which are usually necessary for 
the well-being of the university, but most of which are not immediately 
connected with the central focus of university life. Few university 
presidents can maintain an intimate and direct connection with the 
intellectual life of their institutions, even if they have previously been 
teachers in it and even outstanding scholars or scientists in their own 
discipline. 
There is, nevertheless, merit in Professor Chapman's argument. The 
president, as well as deans, department chairmen and other administrative 
officers, share with the academic staff an interest in and responsibility 
for adherence to the academic ethic. The dispersion of authority within 
the university need not be solely to the academic staff. A dispersion to 
several loci, each of which has Some checking authority on the others, 
may assist in the protection of the university from ill-conceived and 
irresponsible abuses of power. The members of a specialised department 
34 Chapman, John W., "Introduction: The Western University on Trial", in Chapman, 
J. W. (ed.), op. cit., pp. 1-23, p. 13. 
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may be the most competent to judge the professional merits of the work 
of a candidate for appointment, but the chairman or dean is 
usually competent to determine whether the recommendation--whether 
favourable or not--is tainted by extraneous considerations that have little 
or nothing to do with the quality of the candidate's work. The president, 
as the chief administrative and academic officer of the university, does 
bear a heavy burden of responsibility for the maintenance and the 
academic integrity of his institution. What is needed is a dispersion of 
authority to several strata, and not just to one stratum within the 
university, as a means to ensure the protection of the university's central 
purposes. The difficulty is to avoid parochial self-serving while also 
avoiding despotic abuses of authority. 
The legal superiors of the president, the boards of trustees of private 
universities and colleges, seldom have a persistent or competent interest 
in the intellectual aspects of the institutions for which they accept 
responsibility. 35 They regard their responsibilitie~ for the institutions as 
consisting in activities such as raising funds for the institution, advising 
on fundamental economic decisions, or, where needed, mediating 
conflicts between administrators and academics. Nowadays they usually 
abstain from expressing opinions regarding the intellectual activities of 
the university, or about particular appointments or particular research 
projects. It was not this way a hundred, or even 50 years ago, when 
trustees were much more active, although even then only intermittently, 
in the internal affairs of the institution for which they were responsible. 
At present, the trustees of American universities, in general, believe 
that policies and particular decisions about the teaching and research 
should be left to the academic staff and to the administrators. To the 
extent that they take a hand in settling disputes, it is usually in 
connection with internal conflicts regarding the distribution of authority 
rather than in substantive intellectual matters. This is a far cry from 
acting as "owners" of the institution who are primarily responsible for its 
direction, as the conception of the university as "private property" would 
have it. 
Regents of state universities have clearer political responsibilities since 
many are elected in regular elections, others are nominated by the 
elected governor of the state, and still others are civil servants appointed 
by elected officials. Yet they too, for the most part, keep their distance 
from matters of university government, particularly regarding intellectual 
matters. It is in general right that they should do so. 
Whether regents and trustees should be so detached or should take a 
greater role in the management of their universities is open to discussion. 
It could be argued that the reluctance of trustees to be active in the 
35 See Wood, Miriam M., "The Board of Trustees of the Private Liberal Arts College", 
unpublished doctoral dissertation, Harvard University Graduate School of Education, 1983. 
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making of academic policy is a breach of their fiduciary obligations to 
the public at large and to their institutions. Yet it is desirable that the 
trustees should be the protectors against external intrusions and internal 
disruptions which might distract the academic staff and students or 
others within the university from the free pursuit of knowledge. Their 
duty is to see that the university fulfils its task of providing conditions 
conducive to free inquiry and learning. If they are to do so, they must 
do it without interfering in the strictly academic part of the university. 
The distinction is not an easy one to make. 
Conclusion 
The trend of the times of the past two thirds of a century in the 
United States has been to shift the locus of authority from trustees and 
presidents, with deans and departmental chairmen in a secondary 
position, to the teaching staff; within the teaching staff a further internal 
dispersion has been taking place from full professors only, to all teachers 
who hold regular academic appointments, whether on permanent tenure 
or for a restricted duration. These changes have occurred gradually. 
They are not complete. Presidents, vice-presidents, provosts and deans 
still retain important powers in budgetary matters and in the acceptance 
and transmission, ultimately to the board of trustees or regents, of 
recommendations for appointment. There has been no pronounced 
tendency in American colleges and universities to include students within 
governing bodies, although there were for a time in the late 1960s and 
early 1970s demands that they do so. Some colleges have taken a few 
students on to boards of trustees, some have accorded them consultative 
powers but they have not been taken into decision-making bodies. 
There has been no significant movement towards the incorporation of 
secretaries and custodial workers on to governing bodies although the 
formation of trade unions within universities has given these groups 
power over certain non-academic matters. The formation of academic 
trade unions has sometimes given non-academic persons, such as union 
officials who are not always academics, some power in matters of 
reappointment and promotion. To a large extent, the fixing of salaries is 
still done by chairmen in negotiation with individual teachers, sometimes 
by deans. The fixing of salaries is usually not a collective matter except 
where the trade unions of college and university teachers negotiate on 
scales and categories. There are still some universities and colleges in 
the United States where chairmen, deans and academic vice-presidents 
rule without restraint by the mass of teachers, but by and large that 
pattern is diminishing in prominence from its once almost exclusive 
sway. This great transformation has run parallel with a growth in 
academic freedom, and particularly in the civil freedom of academics. In 
so far as members of the boards of trustees or regents, and presidents, 
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were important agents in the infringement of academic and civil freedom 
of teachers, the dispersal of authority away from the oligarchical centres 
has contributed to increased freedom. The dispersion of authority to the 
teaching staff is, in itself, not a guarantee of academic freedom. 
Individually or collectively, members of a university's academic staff can 
be as petty, tyrannical, politically partisan and narrow-minded as anyone 
else. It is desirable that academics should be unqualifiedly devoted to 
the highest standards of assessment, not only in their research and 
teaching but in their decisions about appointments and promotions, 
about the assessment of the work of students and the like. It is, 
however, unrealistic to think that they are unexceptionally and constantly 
so. That is why, even if one accepts and even insists on the rightfulness 
of far-reaching academic self-government by the academic staff, the 
stimulus and vigilance of departmental chairmen, deans, provosts and 
presidents, is still necessary; so is a subtle combination of the several 
patterns of the distribution of authority in academic matters. Even that 
is not sufficient without the saving remnant in which there is a deep 
attachment to the academic ethic. 
